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In the year between the delivery of Professor Nussbaum’s Hochelaga lectures and their publication, the state of the world has deteriorated significantly. An insurgency in Iraq against coalition military forces has mutated into something approaching a civil war. An attack on Israel by a terrorist organisation committed to genocide provoked heavy retaliation that, in turn has hardened attitudes, exacerbated hatreds and polarised opinion to the extent that a war stemming from a conflict of ideologies and involving many nations now seems imminent. It would be a great thing if the writings of an intellectual could slow the mad rush to a mutually assured destruction and make the world a somewhat better place. It is to Professor Nussbaum’s credit that she recognises that more is demanded of a serious moral philosopher than to be merely a passive and dispassionate analyst. In her Hochelaga lectures, building upon much previous work, she constructs a moral framework designed to be of practical use in the project of improving humankind. She aims, as she puts it, to ‘supply definite and useful guidance’.
Appropriate to the present dangerous times, Professor Nussbaum begins with an investigation of terror. Terror is, of course, not a modern phenomenon. Professor Nussbaum takes us back to the suffering inflicted on the city of Troy by the marauding Greeks. The long and dismal history of terror ought to stimulate us to consider how we might, in Professor Nussbaum’s words, ‘build a truly wise concern for humanity’ and ‘try to educate citizens to think well about human relations both inside the nation and across national boundaries’. The emphasis is on education because the upshot of Professor Nussbaum’s deliberations is that the inculcation of compassion is the best chance we have of achieving that wisdom needed to create conditions in which terror no longer thrives. She goes so far as to sketch a syllabus. Children should be educated, she says, to understand common human weakness and vulnerability. ‘Children should learn to be tragic spectators and to understand with increasing subtlety and responsiveness the predicaments to which human life is prone. Through stories and dramas, they should get the habit of decoding the suffering of another, and this decoding should deliberately lead them into lives both near and far.’ We need to ‘cultivate a culture of respectful compassion’, to encourage self-criticism, to educate the emotions. Education, she says in her third lecture, ‘is a key to all the human capabilities’.
Extremely fine words. But, as mentioned above, Professor Nussbaum takes herself to be offering practical advice. One needs to question whether her fine words, far from engaging with practical realities, are simply an exuberant expression of a wild Utopian fantasy. Professor Nussbaum quite obviously has an appetite for learning and has herself benefited from an excellent education. It would be comforting to believe that the majority of people were similarly receptive to knowledge and to the possibility of self-transformation through education, specifically, through moral education, but unfortunately this belief is not supported by any solid evidence. There is evidence a-plenty that, with a little indoctrination, young people can be persuaded to behave atrociously — one thinks of the Hitler Youth and of Mao’s little Red Guards — but it does not follow that, correlatively, exposing the young to tales of deprivation and suffering, indeed, to any training program designed to morally uplift, will persuade them to act kindly.
Drawing upon the work of Kindlon and Thomson, Professor Nussbaum focuses on teenage boys. Although she does not say so explicitly, it is probably young males that she regards as particularly bereft of ‘humane sentiments’ — after all, terrorists world-wide are predominantly male, and it is a safe bet that most of the young people whom, to her dismay, she witnessed aggressively chanting ‘U-S-A, U-S-A’ at a Yankees-Sox baseball game, were men. Terrorism, subjugation and mayhem can also be perpetrated by states either internally (examples are the murderous regimes of Joseph Stalin in Russia, Auguste Pinochet in Chile, Nicolau Ceaucescu in Rumania, Saddam Hussein in Iraq) or externally. But states cannot be subjected to the sort of moral education that Professor Nussbaum has in mind; her target group consists of individual humans. (Presumably when moral education renders all individuals benign, group aggressiveness and state terrorism will wither too.) There are striking differences between the male and female brain, most prominently in the amygdala, a region associated with anger and other negative emotions. It is worth reflecting on the nature of the individual young males whom Professor Nussbaum is hoping to transform.
	We are familiar with lack of compassion or even of concern for peoples from other countries (Adam Smith dramatically highlights this in a passage that Professor Nussbaum cites) and with the disdain for other cultures and the contempt for supporters of rival baseball teams. But an uncaring attitude is not reserved just for our fellow humans. We are negligent of our duties towards non-human animals too, a subject on which Professor Nussbaum has written in her most recent book, Frontiers of Justice. In the country where I am now writing, government figures have just been published that show a dramatic increase in cruelty to animals. The catalogue of the various types of cruelty perpetrated is horrific — putting cats in microwaves and spin dryers, sawing the legs off dogs, tying fireworks into the mouths of animals and blowing their faces off. It is, in the main, young males who do this sort of thing, just for the hell of it — no rivalry is involved, no competition for turf. And it is not just the uneducated or the culturally deprived who have a taste for inflicting gratuitous suffering. In his book Innocence and Experience, Sir Stuart Hampshire (who served in British Intelligence immediately after the Second World War, when he had to interrogate a number of leading Nazis) wrote that he ‘learnt how easy it had been to organise the vast enterprises of torture and murder, and to enrol willing workers in this field….Unmitigated evil and nastiness are as natural, it seemed, in educated human beings as generosity and sympathy: no more, and no less, natural… It became clear that high culture and good education are not significantly correlated with elementary moral decency’. Could a curriculum of the sort that Professor Nussbaum has in mind induce in naturally vile people a bit of compassion?
Well, as Professor Nussbaum points out, compassion is not a simple warm feeling in the gut; it involves quite complex thoughts and feats of imagination, it involves seeing a state of affairs as being connected to one’s own well-being, ‘it involves both trying to look out at the situation from the suffering person’s own viewpoint and then assessing the person’s own assessment’. Professor Nussbaum remarks: ‘Complex though the feat is, young children easily learn it, feeling sympathy with the suffering of animals and other children’. But obviously not all children have learned it, nor is it clear that all could. Seeing things from another’s perspective involves an effort of imagination that even adults are rarely inclined to make, and, in adversarial situations where self-interest is at stake (say, when on trial in a law court), almost never. ‘Working on oneself’, as Wittgenstein called it, is a difficult, often painful undertaking. To voluntarily alter one’s outlook, self-perception and patterns of behaviour requires, first, an honest recognition of one’s inadequacies and, second, a willingness to work at bringing about change in one’s personality. It is doubtful whether children in general possess the necessary motivation. What reason would a child have to subject him/herself to rigorous self-examination when there is no antecedent passion to do so?
Presumably pre-historic man survived because evolution equipped him with the propensity to kill, and with the ability to kill most efficiently by hunting in groups of co-operative con-specifics. However, evolutionary change has not kept pace with technological development, and the result is that modern humans have a residue of the characteristics of our hunter-gatherer ancestors that are not just surplus to present needs but are positively detrimental to our well-being as a species. This is because, as Professor Nussbaum documents, tribalism is now responsible not for killing in the interest of preservation of kin or group, but for gratuitous terror and destruction. Also, the most destructive among us will very soon acquire the technological resources to, at one fell swoop, kill others not just in their hundreds or thousands, but in their millions. Sadly, modern man has been bequeathed the brains of beasts and the capacity for beastliness.
Professor Nussbaum is good on love (read, for example, her ‘Beatrice’s ‘Dante’: Loving the Individual?’, Apeiron 26 (1993), pp.161-78, expanded in her Upheavals of Thought: A Theory of the Emotions) and she clearly draws on first-heart experience. She is good on goodness and its fragility. But she seems less in touch with beastliness and hatred. This is not surprising. Understanding beastliness requires getting into the mind of the beast and, as Thomas Nagel famously pointed out, this may be an impossible task. Distinguished modern novelists (John Updike, Salman Rushdie, Martin Amis) have tried (Terrorist, Shalimar the Clown, The Last Days of Muhammad Atta) and failed. As we saw above, Stuart Hampshire, a highly intelligent and sensitive scholar, needed direct, close contact with evil people to waken him from his naïve academic slumber. Those of us cocooned in the ivory tower are probably quite ill-equipped to offer practical advice on how to make the world a better place because we are, to a large extent, protected from awareness of how terrible the world actually is, and so have only a dimmest conception of the enormity of the task. It is true that a conscientious scholar can travel to troubled and deprived areas but, fêted as a celebrity and an honoured guest, he or she may gain only a superficial understanding of the dreadfulness of lives bedevilled by poverty and oppression, and of the sinister forces conspiring to ensure that they stay that way.
 What took aeons of evolutionary development to construct cannot be dismantled over one or a few generations by administration of the gentle nurturing through education that Professor Nussbaum envisages. One suspects that her programme would be quite ineffective. A recent twin study at the University of Virginia discloses that antisocial traits are frequently inherited (see front page report in The Sunday Times, No. 9518, February 4, 2007). In another study mentioned in the same report, Professor Terrie Moffitt of the Institute of Psychiatry ‘argues that an early diagnosis of a child who is predisposed to bad behaviour may be the key to offering them treatment to stop such tendencies developing’. If Professor Nussbaum is serious about wanting to make us forsake such ingrained traits as greed, self-sufficiency, the urge to dominate others and to crave external goods, then she should be thinking of measures that would effectively bring about the needed adjustments of our neurobiology. This would not, except in extreme cases, involve full frontal lobotomy, but it is conceivable that the various tests routinely performed on the baby at birth might involve a screening of the levels of brain chemicals accompanied by the minimum medical intervention needed to dampen the propensity for mad aggression and other forms of acute anti-social behaviour. One effect would be that sportspersons might lose some of their competitive edge, but this would be no great loss to anyone, as spectators too would be less interested in witnessing the triumph of the victor and the crushing of the vanquished.
Vaccination against the papilloma virus — usually contracted through sexual intercourse and which can lead to cervical cancer — is most effective if administered before girls become sexually active. Most people (there are exceptions) regard this preventative treatment as worthwhile and morally unproblematic. It would be a mistake to construe ‘vaccination’ against violence as a cruel form of pre-punishment or as neo-Nazi eugenics. The biosciences may be harnessed for wholly beneficial purposes (see a very interesting evolving Wikipedia entry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugenics (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Eugenics​)) Behaviour-modifying drug therapy is not new, and all that is being proposed is that it be employed more widely, as preventative medicine against the cancer of a propensity for unprovoked aggression.
I very much doubt that Professor Nussbaum would be receptive to the foregoing suggestion. She would, if I have correctly perceived, from her voluminous output, her outlook, be worried about the implied tampering with our autonomy and with the possibility of turning humans into zombie-like creatures, a spectre she raises, in these lectures, in her discussion of Marcus Aurelius. The worry would be that, in the process of educating his emotional intelligence, a subject is aware of the options on offer and is hence responsible for the adoption of a new perspective that has been made attractive to him, whereas having someone fiddle with his brain is spooky, and a resulting personality change is not subject to his will.
But this worry may be misplaced. The title of one of Charles Darwin’s books is The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Darwin distinguishes between emotions and the different ways in which different creatures give overt expression to their emotions. Dr. Joe Lau, in his contribution to this volume, makes a related, perhaps more subtle, distinction between the emotions and the emotional feelings that they cause. We are, of course, conscious of those feelings but, so Dr. Lau argues, we are not conscious of our emotions. Like Professor Nussbaum, Dr. Lau regards emotions as evaluative judgments, and he claims that all judgments are unconscious. (Daniel Dennett, in his book Freedom Evolves has similarly argued that decisions involved in the process of freely willing may not be conscious.) I take it that, if emotions are to be analysed as seeing something as harmful/beneficial/desirable… to oneself (an analysis that Professor Nussbaum advocates in her reply) then Dr. Lau will be able to retain his point by demonstrating that seeing-as equally operates at a sub-conscious level. If this is right, then, if a Nussbaum-type education does alter our emotions, it operates on our unconscious in no less insidious a manner than does the suggested alternative of a medical intervention. Professor Nussbaum might reply that her own brand of brainwashing is acceptable because it is beneficent and cleansing. But if one is confident of one’s conception of a morally cleansed individual, and one regards it as a serious duty to help bring about the relevant moral improvement in populations, then the outstanding question concerns the ethical limitations on the means of securing that end. It was suggested that the medical procedure take place immediately after birth, before the child has the opportunity of doing any real damage. But, if that is thought unethical, the procedure could be deferred until exactly the age at which the child would embark upon the moral education curriculum that Professor Nussbaum recommends.
Let me emphasise that no irony is intended here. I share Professor Nussbaum’s anguish at the present state of humankind and her sense of the urgency of the need for change. Immediately after the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York, there was celebration — yes, celebration and rejoicing — not just in certain Arab quarters, but in various cities across the world, including Beijing. The capacity of so-called ‘ordinary’ people to loathe ‘the Other’ is truly horrific. One examines despairingly Professor Nussbaum’s list of ‘central human capabilities’, reflecting on how many of these capabilities, in so many places on Earth, are deliberately denied to people by dictators and their henchmen or by malicious individuals or gangs of them that are able to operate in an uncontrolled way or, through inaction or tacit consent, by those who just do not give a damn about the welfare of those remote from themselves. On the blessedly rare occasions when I encounter an irredeemably malignant feral youth who delights in inflicting suffering on innocent creatures, human or otherwise, my instinct, in the words of John Stuart Mill, is ‘solemnly to blot him out from the fellowship of mankind and from the catalogue of the living’. If this remedy is not available, then what seems preferable to the prolonged incarceration of a bad person is some medical treatment to make him a better one, together, of course, with serious attempts to improve that person’s physical and social environment. What does not seem a promising course of action is sending him to a finishing school (unless it’s a Millian ‘finishing’).
It is instructive to speculate on just why Professor Nussbaum reposes such faith in the power of character-education. A clue is provided in her comments on Dr. Lau, where she claims that ‘[w]omen are often taught to suppress and internalize anger, so as not to be conscious of it’ (my emphasis). In her own case, the teaching seems to have been successful because, she tells us, the feeling that she associates with anger is a headache the next day; ‘I have been taught’, she says, ‘to avoid acknowledging that I am angry’. This is dramatic testimony to the efficacy of education. The world would surely be a much safer place if men could be taught to replace the boiling anger triggered by some bad situation with a mild headache the next day. However (perhaps this is a limitation that, as a man, I inherently suffer) I cannot quite get myself to believe Professor Nussbaum’s account. Let us suppose that, three quarters of the way through a marathon race, exhausted and dehydrated, Professor Nussbaum reaches the feeding station, only to find that the idiot on duty there has not brought along enough bottles of water, and there are none left for her (I hope that Professor Nussbaum will forgive my unwarranted assumption that, at that stage of the race, she is not in the leading bunch of runners). Professor Nussbaum (so she would have us believe) calmly takes this setback in her stride, and it is only next day, feeling a characteristic headache, that she muses ‘I must have been angry yesterday; I wonder what could have caused it’. 

Enabling Capabilities
In her next two lectures, ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements’ and ‘Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global Justice’, Professor Nussbaum continues with her mission of elaborating a practical prescription for social improvement. She bridges the gap between the theoretical and the practical by forsaking grand and abstract generalities, preferring to operate at a level of detail such that it is easy for the reader to see how her ideas could be implemented both in policy and on the ground.
The discourse of ‘rights’ can be irritating, first, because it tends to be highly theoretical and thus fails to engage with real-life problems; second, because, in thus failing, it wastes time and deflects us from addressing those problems — do we really need to satisfy ourselves philosophically that a cow has the right to be protected from harm before we actively seek to protect it?; third, because there is a certain pointlesslessness, even cruelty, in, after due deliberation, informing some people that they have a right when it is perfectly clear that they do not have the capability to exercise that right.
The advantage of Professor Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities’ approach is immediately clear: we ought to focus on what people are capable of doing or being, identify which of those capabilities are of such fundamental importance that we can confidently say that people are entitled to exercise them, and then work for the social changes needed to ensure that these entitlements are delivered at or above an appropriate threshold level. Importantly, giving people the capability for X is not the same as forcing X upon them. Professor Nussbaum regards the discourse of capabilities as offering ‘important precision and supplementation to the language of rights’, but this is, perhaps, an unduly modest characterisation of her enterprise. It might be more accurate to depict her as an eliminativist attempting to sweep away the obscure notions embedded in rights-discourse in favour of a more solid and straightforward framework for discussing the flourishing of our and other species. Dr. Joseph Chan, in his contribution to this volume, also suggests that it is to a notion of flourishing that Professor Nussbaum’s ideas about capabilities are ultimately related.
‘Flourishing’ is a term that looms large in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, and it would not be inaccurate to classify Professor Nussbaum as a moral philosopher belonging to this tradition. Her basic plan is to attempt to justify a list of capabilities that are central requirements of a life that exhibits (she quotes Marx) ‘truly human functioning’. But she does mean ‘flourishing’, rather than ‘functioning’. She says that her starting point is a conception of the dignity of the human being. But, again, ‘dignity’ is not quite the right word. It means ‘sense of worth’, but, attempting to define the term more closely reveals it to be negative in connotation — someone who has dignity is not enslaved, demeaned, exploited. Professor Nussbaun criticises the neo-liberal tradition for its emphasis on ‘negative liberty’; she thinks that we should be shooting for something more positive, not a minimally human life but a good or truly human life. So, for consistency, it seems to me that Professor Nussbaum ought to be talking not about dignity but about the provision of material and institutional support for achieving those capabilities necessary for a positively flourishing existence. The wilful or callously neglectful impeding of someone’s flourishing is a dehumanizing affront to that person’s self, a point that Professor Ci Jiwei, harnessing conceptual resources made available by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, elaborates and discusses at length in his contribution to this volume.
 Allied to, and in harmony with Professor’s Nussbaum’s moral philosophy is her politics. She is a feminist, and a socialist, an advocate of what is disparagingly but unfairly, termed the ‘nanny state’. Nanny is not a bossy wicked stepmother imposed upon us by circumstances beyond our control. We ought, so Professor Nussbaum says ‘to create a decent institutional structure and then to regard individuals as delegating their ethical responsibility to that structure…. assign[ing] the responsibility for promoting others’ well-being (capabilities) to institutions, giving individuals broad discretion about how to use their lives apart from that’. The state is required to provide affirmative support especially, of course, to the least well off. Those who disparage the nanny state typically depict it as fussily interfering in the lives of citizens. But the sort of state that Professor Nussbaum wants is one that cares for those of its citizens that suffer disadvantage through disability, poverty and discrimination. Proper provision of such care inevitably involves a redistribution of wealth, and hence it is typically the ungenerous wealthy who sarcastically portray state caring as interference.
By contrast, Professor Nussbaum would be strenuously in favour of (for example) diverting funds in the direction of providing an education for women whose ambition to learn had previously been systematically stifled. She sets herself firmly against the libertarian position (defended pre-eminently by Robert Nozick) and, as we have seen, is prepared to accept a certain degree of social engineering (through education) to wean people off selfishness and ungenerosity. And she is certainly in favour of restrictions on certain liberties when the exercise of those liberties involves taking liberties with the more central liberties of others. She is commendably forthright on this matter: ‘[N]o society that pursues equality or even an ample social minimum can avoid curtailing freedom in very many ways, and what it ought to say is: those freedoms are not good, they are not part of a core group of entitlements required by the notion of social justice, and in many ways, indeed, they subvert those core entitlements’. Dr. Joseph Chan (this volume) raises the question: ‘What injustice or unfairness will be perpetrated (and by whom) if society fails to deliver those basic capabilities to (say) the less well-off?’ I am sure that Professor Nussbaum would have no hesitation in replying that the injustice is that a disadvantaged group is being denied some fundamental entitlements, and that responsibility for this injustice lies with the government, or perhaps ultimately with those who elected or selected the government.
A philosopher who wishes to engage in politics and social policymaking, who does not want to be regarded as a dilettante but as someone seriously contributing to the process of effecting real change, must be prepared to take a stand on the pressing problems of public life. Various elements of Professor Nussbaum’s views bring her face to face with some of these hard questions. She execrates parochialism and wants people to overcome the ‘difficulty of keeping our minds fixed on the sufferings of people who live on the other side of the world’. But keeping one’s mind fixed is a private kind of thing and, if one is concerned about improving the lot of those people, one must progress to saying and to doing; in other words, to making some kind of intervention. This does not mean, of course, that Professor Nussbaum should be in the business of attempting to impose American values on the rest of the world, for she is perfectly clear that there are features of (for example) the Indian constitution that are morally in advance of counterpart clauses in the American constitution. But, given that there are principles enshrined in some constitutions to which she willingly subscribes and which, in her view transcend national boundaries, it follows that her proselytizing should be global in its reach, and this is indeed the theme of her final lecture. She seems committed, in the words of the title of a recent book by Kwame Anthony Appiah, to cosmopolitanism — to an ‘ethics in a world of strangers’.
It is difficult to reconcile this internationalist stance with Professor Nussbaum’s sensitivity to cultural difference and respect for cultural diversity, because some cultures embrace practises to which she herself is strongly morally opposed. This is a tension that she devotes much of the lectures to attempting to relieve. There are opposite strategies available to her, the first is to condemn and to battle against practices that, however deeply entrenched they may be in a particular culture, one knows to be wrong. The second is appeasement. It is the latter, timid, course that Professor Nussbaum appears to favour. She deliberately confines her ‘central human capabilities’ to a short list. Further, although she advertises it as a virtue of her list that it is ‘specific’, she nevertheless insists that ‘the items on the list ought to be specified in a somewhat abstract and general way’. By these means she is able to duck controversy and avoid confrontation. But, though those may be useful measures to employ when attempting to maintain peaceful relations with one’s friends and relatives, they are hardly appropriate when one’s goal is a consistent, soundly motivated prescription for global social justice. Professor Nussbaum contrasts Professor Ci’s rather abstract theorizing with the approach that she prefers, which is to get down and dirty and to deal with ‘concrete cases’ one by one. But this approach is likely to bear fruit only if one steadfastly resists the temptation to evade the tricky cases. She criticizes Amartya Sen for failing to grasp the nettle of recommending a definite list of central capabilities ‘as important goals for all the world’s people’, but her own grasp is not firm and her hand is enclosed in a kid glove.
A straightforward test case is religion. ‘Freedom of religious exercise’ belongs in the ‘central human capabilities’ that Professor Nussbaum seeks to protect. But what if a certain religion prescribes that, in a court of law, the voice of a man shall be equal to that of two women, or recommends the stoning to death of women as the penalty for adultery, or advocates the practice of clitorectomy (the mutilation of the female genitalia)? It is perfectly obvious that, in conscientiously trying to safeguard such practices in the name of pluralism, one is at the same time denying other central capabilities, such as bodily health, bodily integrity and being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain. No doubt Professor Nussbaum vehemently despises such practices but they are not isolated phenomena. They are supported by a deep cultural/religious substructure that can only be dislodged by taking a heavy bulldozer to it, or exploding it with argumentative dynamite. There is overwhelming evidence of violence in patriarchal religions (see http://www.pelican-consulting.com/solisustv02n08.html (​http:​/​​/​www.pelican-consulting.com​/​solisustv02n08.html​)). We are treated daily to the spectacle of religious leaders deliberately provoking rage and the consequent lasting anger (see the quote from Judith Shklar in footnote 40 of Professor Ci’s paper) and fostering what Professor Nussbaum (following Sen) calls ‘adaptive preferences’, roughly, preferences for what one has been cynically gulled into believing are in one’s best interests, but which are not. It is clear that, in many instances, the exercise of religious freedom can be profoundly damaging, so we are morally bound to seek to prevent it. Yet our distaste for cultural imperialism prompts us to defend it.
This is a dilemma that Onora O’Neill sensitively explores in her ‘Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism’, Ethics 98 (1988), pp.705-22, and it is one that sucks Professor Nussbaum into the raging vortices between Scylla and Charybdis. She tries to steer a safe course by insisting on ‘a rather strong separation between issues of justification and issues of implementation’. She believes that her list of central human capabilities can be justified as a good basis for political principles all round the world, ‘but’, she says ‘this does not mean that we thereby license intervention with the affairs of a state that does not recognize them. It is a basis of persuasion’. Persuasion? Since when have oppressive regimes been amenable to persuasion through the wise philosophical counsel of outsiders? It is hard to think of a single instance.
Let us consider a state whose sovereignty is grounded in the consent of the people, which mercilessly persecutes and curtails the political freedoms of certain minorities of its citizens, where the ‘consent’ of the women is an adaptive preference and which constantly flexes its military muscle, thereby inducing instability in the region. So, although it is not committing any of the traditionally recognized grave crimes against humanity (I take it that what Professor Nussbaum has principally in mind is genocide) that state is undeniably abrogating the central capabilities of large swathes of citizenry. I take it that many people would agree that there are pragmatic considerations that might militate against forceful intervention by (say) the United Nations. But Professor Nussbaum’s position seems to be that non-intervention is not just prudent, but is morally right. Yet, following Sen, she says that ‘some human matters [such as education for women or adequate health care] are too important to be left to whim and caprice, or even to the dictates of a cultural tradition’. So would she be in favour of real (not just verbal) intervention after all? No. Her position is that we should say to an offending state ‘You know, you too should endorse equal education for girls, and understand it as a fundamental constitutional entitlement. You too should provide a certain level of health care to all citizens’. But, in her view, our action is to stop short at saying. Unfortunately, when our solemn and well-meaning advice is ignored, half the population continues to receive unequal education and the poor continue to receive inadequate health care, or none at all, while our ‘tireless efforts of persuasion, political mobilization and selective funding’ follow their slow and probably doomed course. ‘Say, but don’t do, and leave them to stew’ may be good poetry, but it is not a respectable political maxim. Although Professor Nussbaum isn’t exactly advocating doing nothing one wonders how bad things have to get in a state before she considers it right for the outside world to coercively intervene. Has Zimbabwe reached that tipping point?
The tension in her position becomes even more acute when we come to consider non-democratic states. Professor Nussbaum believes that people should be allowed to settle for themselves whether, and, if so, how, central capabilities are to be implemented. She evinces her respect for democratic deliberation. Military and economic sanctions on a state are to be avoided, she thinks, when the sovereignty of that state is grounded in the consent of the people. So what should the democratic states of the world do when a tyrannical regime subjugates women and generally oppresses a population that has little or no say in its own destiny? Is this one of those cases provided for in the second of her ‘Ten Principles for the Global Structure’ where coercion is justified? Should we use whatever means are at our disposal to effect a regime change? Is it Professor Nussbaum’s view that military intervention and economic sanction are justified in such a case? Should we crusade for democracy? There are reasons to hold that global justice is something worth fighting for (and not just with words). Does Professor Nussbaum endorse those reasons? She does not say.
But there is much that she could say and, doubtless will say in future publications. It is a sign of a good series of lectures that it is thought-provoking; the audience is left pondering interesting questions and is craving to hear more. By this criterion (and several others) these lectures have been valuable, and we are very grateful to Professor Nussbaum for delivering them.

